

REACTIVE

ACTIONS

To tackle the situation

COPERATIONS

CONTINUITY

TRUST

CYBER

SECURITY

IN KEEP!





- MEET CUSTOMER'S NEEDS

MANAGE SUPPLY CHAIN















COMPOUND RISKS

WORLD

COMPOUND

COM

DON'T TURN DOWN
UNCONVENTIONAL
IDEAS in these
TURBULENT TIMES

ANAGING DISRUPTION

SENERGY SYSTE

"in the DARK, ALL SWANS are BLACK,,




Fig. 4. The unsafe act and mechanical hazard constitute the central factor in the accident sequence.


Fig. 5. The removal of the central factor makes the action of preceding factors ineffective.

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
Recovery actions of Apollo 13, US Airways 1549 and San José Mine accidents with FRAM



Fonte: https://www.sciencemuseumgroup.org.uk/blog/eastlondonandford/



"...there are still systems and processes being developed with their epistemological base in the production line of the 1st Industrial Revolution, perpetuating a mistaken understanding of the complex reality of 21st century workplaces."



MANAGEMENT CONTROLS MAN FAILURE KNOWLEDGE-ATTITUDE-FITNESS-ABILITY WHICH CAUSES OR PERMITS

UNSAFE ACTS OF PERSONS

- OPERATING WITHOUT CLEARANCE, FAILURE TO SECURE OR WARN
- OPERATING OR WORKING AT UNSAFE SPEED
- MAKING SAFETY DEVICES INOPERATIVE
- 4. USING UNSAFE EQUIPMENT, OR EQUIPMENT UNSAFELY
 5. UNSAFE LOADING, PLACING, MIXING, COMBINING, ETC.
- TAKING UNSAFE POSITION OR POSTURE
- WORKING ON MOVING OR DANGEROUS EQUIPMENT
- DISTRACTING, TEASING, ABUSING, STARTLING, ETC.
- FAILURE TO USE SAFE ATTIRE OR PERSONAL PROTECTIVE DEVICES

UNSAFE MECHANICAL OR PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

- INADEQUATELY GUARDED, GUARDS OF IMPROPER HEIGHT, STRENGTH, MESH, ETC.
- UNGUARDED, ABSENCE OF REQUIRED GUARDS
- DEFECTIVE, ROUGH, SHARP, SLIPPERY, DECAYED, CRACKED, ETC.
- UNSAFELY DESIGNED MACHINES, TOOLS, ETC. UNSAFELY ARRANGED, POOR-HOUSEKEEPIN CONGESTION, BLOCKED EXITS, ETC.
- INADEQUATELY LIGHTED, SOURCES OF GLARE, ETC.
- INADEQUATELY VENTILATED, IMPURE AIR SOURCE, ETC.
- UNSAFELY CLOTHED, NO GOGGLES GLOVES OR MASKS, WE ARING HIGH HEELS, ETC.

THE FOUNDATION F A MAJOR INJURY 29 MINOR INJURIES 300 NO-INJURY ACCIDENTS

00.3% OF ALL ACCIDENTS PRODUCE MAJOR INJURIES----08.8% OF ALL ACCIDENTS PRODUCE MINOR INJURIES----90.8% OF ALL ACCIDENTS PRODUCE NO INJURIES-----

THE RATIOS GRAPHICALLY PORTRAYED ABOVE---1--29-900 SHOW THAT IN A UNIT GROUP OF 330 SIMILAR ACCIDENTS, 300 WILL PRODUCE NO INJURY WHATEVER, 29 WILL RE-SULT ONLY IN MINOR INJURIES AND I WILL RESULT SERI-

THE MAJOR INJURY MAY RESULT FROM THE VERY FIRST ACCIDENT OR FROM ANY OTHER ACCIDENT IN THE GROUP. MORAL-PREVENT THE ACCIDENTS AND THE INJURIES WILL TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES.

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To help us, we can be clear about how we think about human factors:

- · People interact with each other, plants and processes as part of a complex system. Human beings are essential in maintaining our barriers and safeguards. They can, and often do, "save the day". · We understand and accept that people will make mistakes,
- but these are typically due to underlying conditions and systems. People's actions are rarely malicious and usually make sense to them at the time. Since human error will never be eliminated entirely, we try to make sure that our most critical tasks and barriers are resistant to error.
- Understanding how mistakes happen can help us prevent or cope with them. We use what we learn to design plants, tools and activities to reduce mistakes and better manage risk.
- · Finally, we know that leaders help shape the conditions that influence what people do. It matters how leaders respond when things go wrong."

From IOGP Report 453 - Safety Leadership in Practice: A Guide for managers

What the experts say about "80% human error"

When the 80 percent human error is broken down further, it reveals that the majority of errors associated with events come from latent organisational weaknesses (mostly the result of human and organisation actions in the past) whereas about 30 percent are caused by the individual worker who last touched the equipment or process.





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CP and

IOGP Report 453 Safety Leadership in Practice

Environment Systems and Decisions https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-022-09884-w

Technical Skills

Individual WORKER


Analyzing non-technical skills in the sharp end of facilities/utilities operations in onshore and offshore O&G process plants

Josué França 10 · Antônio Oliveira 2 · Luciana Silva 3 · Pär Karlsson 1

environment into meaningful internal representations that can be used to guide behaviour and assess risks (Carter et al., 2019). This human intrinsic neurobiological characteristic allows the situation awareness of the surroundings, as much as the risk perceptions of situations, places and interactions (Balcetis & Lassiter, 2010). Therefore, comparing written information with visual information, visual perception is the first step that precedes individual and collective answers for all external stimulus received, seeming reasonably to use this as an efficient way to promote safety.

enables an integration between productivity and safety in the entire system, which ultimately characterizes its resilience. Therefore, these human adaptive variabilities resulting from their competences are not a problem of the system, but a solution response to the demands of the dynamic and complex functioning of the entire sociotechnical system.

Author contributions JF and AO wrote the main manuscript text, supported by Luciana Silva and supervised by PK. JF and LS selected and prepared the tables and figures of the manuscript. PK proofread the text. All authors reviewed the manuscript.




Non-Technical Skills are the cognitive and social skills that complement technical skills and contribute to safe and efficient task performance.

Rhona Flin (2008)

Of these NTS, five are highlighted:

- Situation Awareness
- Decision-Making
- Teamwork
- Leadership
- Communication






NTS not only complement a worker's technical skills: they are part of the job itself and cannot be "removed" from the equation!

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TEAMWORK

The ability to work effectively and interdependently in groups of two or more to achieve a common goal.



More than 400,000 Km away from Earth!!

"We at the capsule, and them, in the Mission Control, we were just one team at that time." Jim Lovell

02 07 55 19	LMP	Okay, Houston
02 07 55 20	CDR	I believe we've had a problem here.
02 07 55 28	cc	This is Houston. Say again, please.
02 07 55 35	CDR	Houston, we've had a problem. We've had a MAIN B BUS UNDERVOLT.
02 07 55 42	cc	Roger. MAIN B UNDERVOLT.
02 07 55 58	cc	Okay, stand by, 13. We're looking at it.
		A Committee of the Comm



Gene Kranz NASA Chief Flight Director Apollo and Gemini Programs

LEADERSHIP

"It isn't equipment that wins the battles; it is the quality and the determination of the people fighting for a cause in which they believe."


> "Everything I've ever thought about doing has been, in some sense, about helping people."





Jacinda Ardern


Prime Minister of New Zealand

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DECISION-MAKING

The ability to make a judgment or choose an appropriate option to meet the needs of an assessed or anticipated situation, as well as unforeseen ones.




"From everything I saw, knew, and felt, my decision had been made: LaGuardia was out. Wishing or hoping otherwise wasn't going to help." Captain Sully


"Not every situation can be foreseen or anticipated. There isn't a checklist for everything." Captain Sully


"The natural human resilience is what brought us here as a Society, and it will continue to keep us prepared for the most diverse situations." Prof. Josué França




"It is the first time in U.S. aviation history that we interview the pilot and the copilot after a plane crash." FAA Investigator










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Recovery actions of Apollo 13, US Airways 1549 and San José Mine accidents with FRAM



The 2010 Copiapó mining accident began on 5 August 2010, with a cave-in at the San José copper-gold mine, located in the Atacama Desert.


Thirty-three men were trapped 700 meters (2,300 ft) underground and 5 kilometers (3 mi) from the mine's entrance.


They were rescued after 69 days.





Three separate drilling rig teams and the US space agency – NASA, helped by a dozen corporations from around the world cooperated in completing the rescue.

On 13 October 2010, "los 33" were winched to the surface one at a time, in a specially built capsule, called Fenix.









Recovery actions of Apollo 13, US Airways 1549 and San José Mine accidents with FRAM

Learn from accidents

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More than ever before in history, individuals can now band together to solve grand challenges. We face enormous problems, but we 'as individuals' have enormous power to solve them.

Peter H. Diamandis


Since the beginning of the Modern Era, the O&G Industry has been the driving force of all technological evolution of Humanity.

Daniel Yergin, The New Map

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YouTube "Professor Josué E. Maia Franca"

https://www.youtube.com/c/ProfessorJosu%C3%A9EMaiaFranca/videos

josue.maia@gmail.com josue.maia@petrobras.com.br Obrigado!

Tack så mycket!